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I. Introduction 
This brief is in reply to the arguments made by Claimant related to Defendants' cross-
appeal of the Industrial Commission's denial of their Motion to Strike Claimant's Post-Hearing 
Reply Brief and the questions raised regarding the Industrial Commission's jurisdiction, or lack 
thereof, related to the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association and the ability to award attorney 
fees under the provisions of the Guaranty Association Act. Claimant relies upon a subsequent 
decision by the Industrial Commission in Marlene Griffith v. Firstbank Northwest, et. aL, I.C. 
1999-031588, as a basis for her arguments in response. However, Claimant fails to inform the 
Court that the decision itself is also the subject of a similar appeal, which again asks this Court to 
consider the extent and scope of the Industrial Commission's jurisdiction over the Guaranty 
Association. Defendants continue to contend that should the Court in the present matter reverse 
the factual findings and remand the case for further proceedings, that the extent of those 
proceedings would be limited solely to the areas expressly defined by statute for the 
Commission. 
Claimant raises what are best called "policy arguments" in favor of their interpretation of 
the Commissions Judicial Rules of Practice as they relate to post-hearing briefing and suggest 
that a claimant should be given the unfair advantage of extensive briefing when compared to that 
available to a defendant. She has propounded no persuasive case law to establish that a 
defendant in a worker's compensation case should be constrained to respond to arguments raised 
and present their own case in less pages than those available to claimant. The Rules, of which 
the comments are a part, define the proper parameters for the fair resolution of issues brought 
before the Commission. 
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As such, Defendants respectfully request that in the alternative that the Court reverses the 
Industrial Commission as requested by Claimant, that it issue an opinion instructive on the issues 
raised in cross-appeal. 
II. The Industrial Commission erred by denying Defendants' Motion to Strike 
Claimant's Post-Hearing Reply Brief. 
Contrary to Claimant's arguments, Defendants have demonstrated that the Industrial 
Commission failed to adhere to its own procedural rules and guidelines when it refused to grant 
the Motion to Strike. Only recently has there arisen confusion about the page limits contained in 
Judicial Rule of Procedure II(A) and its subsequent Comment. The claimants' bar has pounced 
upon the argument that the Rule should be read to give them an edge in post-hearing briefing, 
suggesting that they should be given double the number of pages available to present their 
arguments. In the past, it was common practice for claimants' counsel to submit an opening 
brief that was 20 to 25 pages long, reserving 5 to 10 pages for rebuttal in the responsive brief. 
Defendants' counsel have always known that they were limited solely to thirty pages, forcing 
them to address the arguments raised in the initial brief and attempt counter any arguments that 
may be raised in the short reply. Now, to adopt the approach that Claimant's counsel has 
recommended, defendants would face the insurmountable task of responding to sixty pages of 
arguments in half the space. It is impossible to see how such an interpretation of the J.R.P. could 
be considered fair and practical. 
As with her later arguments, Claimant relies upon a recent decision of the Industrial 
Commission in the case of Marlene Griffith v. Firstbank Northwest, et. aL, I.C. 1999-031588, 
as the basis for the argument that the motion was properly denied. As mentioned above, one of 
the issues presently on appeal in Griffith is the page limit discrepancy. Claimant focuses upon 
the use of the word "briefing" in the comment to J.R.P. l1(A) and contends that it has both a 
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plural and singular meaning, and that fairness dictates that it should be interpreted to only in the 
singular, allowing each brief submitted to be thirty pages long. Claimant then goes on to argue, 
that to find otheIWise, would allow a claimant to " ... put nothing in its initial brief, leaving the 
Defendant with nothing to "reply" to," implying that the claimant could then swoop in with a 
subsequent response that covers the issues at hearing. Unfortunately, Claimant's logic is flawed 
in that it ignores the requirements of due process and judicial procedure mandating that all issues 
to be tried be addressed in the opening brief. This Court was clear in holding that under Idaho 
case law issues addressed by an administrative tribunal must be presented such that new issues 
cannot be raised without first serving an affected party with fair notice and providing a full 
opportunity to meet the issue. See, White v. Idaho Forest Indus., 98 Id 784, 786, 527 P. 2d 887 
(1977). A claimant submitting a brief with nothing to reply to runs the risk of waiving the ability 
to respond. 
The truly prejudicial effect of the Industrial Commission's decision in the present matter 
is evidenced by the briefing by Claimant on appeal. The majority of issues raised by Claimant 
on appeal appeared in her "reply" brief and subsequent briefing on reconsideration. The fact that 
these issues were not raised in the initial briefing is interesting and important with respect to the 
waiver argument. If the Industrial Commission had properly struck Claimant's reply brief at the 
outset, we would most likely not be before the Court today. Fortunately, the Commission 
properly addressed the factual issues before it and found in Defendants' favor. As before, the 
unambiguous language and comment of l.R.P. 11 imposes a thirty (30) post-hearing briefing 
page limit and as a matter of due process Defendants are entitled to the benefit of such 
procedural protection. See generally, Madrano v. Neibaur, 136 Idaho 767,40 P.3d 125 (2002). 
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III. The Industrial Commission does not have subject matter jurisdiction 
over the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association Act. 
With respect to Claimant's arguments that the Industrial Commission does have subject 
matter jurisdiction over the actions to be taken by the Idaho Guaranty Association, Claimant 
again turns to the recent decision of Marlene Griffith v. Firstbank Northwest, et. aL, supra. She 
focuses heavily upon the Commission's assertion that the defendants in Griffith must pay in full 
all claims made against them in that matter. The author(s) of Griffith attempt to interpret the 
scope if the Insurance Guaranty Act, as it relates to worker's compensation law, to justify the 
intended result. Unfortunately, for the same reasons that Griffith is on appeal, the Commission 
has overstepped its bounds and entered into an area not within their statutory powers and 
authority. 
Defendants acknowledge that Idaho Code § 41-3605(7) defines what is a "covered claim" 
under the Act; however, that language alone does not extend to the Industrial Commission the 
power to enforce an order against the Association for payment of a worker's compensation 
judgment. Defendants contend that the Industrial Commission has the authority to determine the 
amount of liability that could have been assessed against the defunct surety had it not come 
under the auspices of the Guaranty Act. To the contrary, the further provisions of the Guaranty 
Act then serve to govern how much, if any, of the liability assessed is to be paid. 
That difference alone between the Idaho version of the Act and that of Minnesota does 
not serve to invalidate the arguments previously raised. Although Defendants understand 
Claimant's interest in seeing the Guaranty Association treated in the same light as the now 
defunct surety, that is not the reason behind the creation of this statutorily created body. As 
previously argued, the Association is not to be treated as the last resort if other sources of 
compensation exist to reimburse a claimant. 
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Claimant suggests that the record is devoid of any proof that Claimant's bills could be or 
were being covered by a third-party insurer, although she acknowledges that she was receiving 
Social Security disability and Medicaid benefits. To the contrary, Defendants assert that 
Claimant failed to present any outstanding medical expenses into evidence that had not been paid 
or reimbursed by third-party sources. Claimant bears the burden of proof to establish the amount 
of any unpaid or outstanding medical expenses, not Defendants. Claimant's Social Security file, 
which is quite voluminous, was presented as a hearing exhibit and is before the Court on appeal. 
Notwithstanding the above, the Idaho Guaranty Association Act implicitly sets forth the 
statutory framework for the administration of claims, including what aspects of each claim 
should be given deference or priority over others. Without the Act, claimants would be faced 
with the untenable position of trying to recover benefits through the complicated bankruptcy 
process. 
Claimant next refers the Court to the Commission's finding in Griffith that the medical 
expenses at issue in that case were "typically excluded from private health policies," suggesting 
that the expenses existing in the present matter may also be similarly situated. Unfortunately, 
this is going to be a major issue before the Court in the Griffith appeal for the Defendants. There 
is no evidence in the record below in Griffith that this was expressly the case with Ms. Griffith's 
third-party insurer(s). The Commission's assumptions are just that, and not based upon any 
evidence. The speculative nature of this type of conclusion is but one example as to why 
Griffith is being appealed. Turning to the matter at hand, Claimant presented no evidence at 
hearing or on reconsideration that there was any "exclusion" relevant to her argument. 
Defendants seek the protection from this Court from conflicting interpretations of the Act 
from the State's administrative agencies. The Act itself contains a straight-forward process for 
submitting a claim and appealing any decision by the Guaranty Association. Defendants merely 
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request that the Court acknowledge the confines and strictures of the Guarantee Act and direct 
the Commission to structure its decisions accordingly. 
IV. If the Industrial Commission does have subject matter jurisdiction, it should be 
directed to comport with the appropriate provisions of Idaho Insurance Guaranty 
Association Act. 
Claimant's reliance again upon the Griffith decision with respect to Defendants' 
arguments about the ability, or lack thereof, for the Commission to award attorneys fees against 
the Guaranty Association is misplaced. Notwithstanding the fact that Griffith is also on appeal, 
the underlying reasoning of the Commission in Griffith for finding to the contrary is also 
misguided. In Griffith, the Commission referred to an outdated case for the definition of the 
terms "damages," "punitive damages" or "exemplary damages." The Commission, and Claimant 
in the present matter, suggest that the discussion of the reasoning behind an award of attorney 
fees in the case of Dennis v. School District No. 91, 135 Idaho 94, 98, 15 P.3d 329, 333 (2000) 
should be similarly applied in the present matter. However, this line of argument ignores the fact 
that the decision in Dennis, although issued in the year 2000, is based upon reasoning originating 
in 1969. 
This Court puts forth the proposition in Dennis that attorneys fees in worker's 
compensation cases matters should be deemed compensation to the injured employee instead of a 
penalty, which stems from the prior decision of Mayo v. SafewayStores, Inc., 93 Idaho 161,457 
P.2d 400 (1969). Unfortunately, Mayo was decided prior to the adoption of the provisions in the 
Idaho Insurance Guarantee Association Act. The facts in Dennis did not involve a defunct 
surety or otherwise raise any questions germane to the current appeal. Therefore, the Court has 
never had the opportunity to address the relationship ofI.C. § 41-3605(7) as it relates to I.C. §72-
804. 
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This Court has previously noted that "Worker's compensation statutes must be considered 
in the context of the entire act." Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Van Tine, 132 Idaho 902, 909, 980 
P.2d 566 (1999) (internal citations omitted). In the same context, the availability, or lack thereof, 
to issue an award of attorney fees and costs in the present matter should be considered in the 
context of the Insurance Guaranty Association Act, which governs the party against whom fees 
are sought. The actions for which fees are sought in the underlying case relate to a decision 
made by the now defunct surety, not the Guaranty Association. Claimant presented no evidence 
or facts at hearing to justify why an award was warranted against the present Defendants. 
V. Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
Claimant has failed to present any foundation to establish why she would be entitled to an 
award of attorneys fees on appeal. For the reasons set forth in Defendants' opening brief and 
addressed above, it is questionable whether Claimant would even be entitled to an award of fees 
or costs under I.e. § 41-3605(7). The issues raised on cross-appeal are issues of first impression 
and do not warrant a finding that they were brought frivolously or without grounds. Claimant's 
reliance upon the decision in Griffith as a basis for fees in the present matter is unjustified. 
Griffith involves a separate set of facts and evidence, none of which is properly before the Court 
in this matter and should be used as the basis of any decision in that regard. 
VI. Conclusion. 
For the above and foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that in the 
alternative the Court reverses and remands the Industrial Commission's final decision of the 
underlying matter, that it reverse the Commission's ruling on Defendants' Motion to Strike and 
that it address the issues raised with respect to the Industrial Commission's jurisdiction as it 
relates to the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association Act. 
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* 'I( RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this __ day of June, 2010. 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
CERTIFICAT~F SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this '1 ~ day of June, 2010, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENTS '/CROSS-APPELLANTS , BRIEF by delivering the 
same to each of the following attorneys of record, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as 
follows: 
R. Brad Masingill 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
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